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STEPHEN P. MUMME*

Managing Acute Water Scarcity on the
U.S.-Mexico Border: Institutional
Issues Raised by the 1990's Drought
INTRODUCTION
The "Great 1990's Drought" certainly ought to serve as a wake-up
call for binational water management on the U.S.-Mexico border. Whether
it will function as such remains to be seen. While the drought has had
highly adverse effects in northern Mexico, the hardest hit of the several
regions affected, its effects are unevenly distributed. Some may even draw
the lesson that the drought, at least in Texas, has been well managed within
the context of current institutional structures, and that it provides solid
evidence the system is working, is flexible, and is adequate to meet most
foreseeable needs, at least at the international level.
It is fair to say that the prospect of catastrophic drought has long
preoccupied water managers in the arid border region-indeed the thrust
of binational water management since the nineteenth century has centered
on controlling or mitigating the consequences of droughts and floods.
Drought, in fact, is a periodically recurrent phenomenon in the region and
a vital factor-coupled with the region's natural aridity-driving the
reclamation (water storage and distribution) movement. On the U.S.Mexico border, the two major treaties allocating shared water resources
anticipate drought in at least two ways: first, by providing for the
development of water storage and delivery systems that aim at regularizing supply and husbanding scarce resources; and second, by addressing in
some fashion the problem of rationing shared waters in times of abnormal
or unexpected scarcity of supply of allocated water.
The problem, of course, is that neither of these strategies is
sufficient to satisfy the competing (and growing) demand for water within
the region. This, perhaps, is the principal lesson to be gleaned from the
1990's drought. In the United States, for example, surface water on the
major international rivers is overallocated in relation to its availability.
Even before the drought a wide range of proposals was advanced to
augment water storage related to the use of the waters of the international
rivers, reflecting the rising demand for water. Indeed, a number of major
storage and distribution projects have been completed in the past decade
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in the United States and Mexico, and others are under consideration.1
Moreover, the international mechanisms for rationing the costs of drought,
or more to the point, the water available under drought conditions, remain
controversial and, in their present form, are widely seen as less than adequate for equitably settling potential disputes within the treaty framework.
Taking the 1990's drought as its reference, the present study
reviews the flaws, perceived and actual, in the present institutional
framework for managing drought along the U.S.-Mexico border and points
to a range of options for strengthening international cooperation in drought
management that warrant the attention of binational water managers. In
approaching the topic, it is important to begin from the assumption that the
design of adequate institutional mechanisms for drought management is
as much a social challenge as a physical challenge, perhaps more so, and
that droughts, conceptualized as water shortages, are as much socially
constructed phenomena as they are absolute reductions in the volume of
available water.2 Drought management is usually aimed more at the
satisfaction of human wants than at meeting the most basic human needs,
though the latter may be of concern, depending on distributional criteria
applied to the provision of scarce water resources, on socio-economic
conditions, and on the severity of natural supply reductions over time. The
perceived need for water and its equitable utilization under normal and
abnormal circumstances of supply are usually relative judgments that
contribute to the complexity of drought management and the perceived
adequacy of water management systems. This is especially true of binational water management institutions which, by definition, embrace different
countries, different socio-economic systems, and different cultural realities.
This study also proceeds from the assumption that certain options
raised in discussion of the 1990's drought are essentially untenable. Several
commentators on the drought, for instance, have called for fundamental
revisions to the present treaty framework, revisions that aim at treaty
language more congruent with current canons of customary international
law.3 While the normative and substantive value of such revisions is not

1. For instance, for a discussion of new water storage proposals on the Rio Grande, see
DAVID J. EATON &DAVID HuRLUR, CHALLiNGES INTHE BINATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF WATER
RESOURCEs IN THE RiO GRANDE/RIO BRAVO (1992); LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC

AFFAIRS, WATER AND DEVELOPMENT, THE Rio GRANDE/Rio BRAVO (Jurgen Schmandt ed.,
1992/1993); Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, An Overtaxed Giant:Farmingand Urban Growth Along the
Border Push Texas' Longest River to its Limits, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Sept. 21,1997, at Al.
2. See Diana M. Liverman, Drought Impacts in Mexico: Climate, Agriculture,Technology,
and Land Tenure in Sonora and Puebla,50 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 49,49-50 (1990).

3. See Melissa Lopez, Border Tensions and the Need for Water: An Application of Equitable
Principles to DetermineWater Allocation from the Rfo Grande to the United States and Mexico, 9
GEO. INTL ENVTL L. REV. 489 (1997).
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disputed here, the political barriers to achieving such revisions are
sufficiently great as to justify the search for more achievable policy reforms.
With these caveats in mind, this study proceeds in several parts. The first
section reviews the extant binational framework for drought management,
recapitulating what many others have said about the shortcomings of that
framework and pointing out key structural elements affecting the prospects
for bilateral cooperation in managing drought situations along the border.
The second section briefly reviews the recent drought for the institutional
responses and approaches taken by the governments, with emphasis on the
1995 water sharing agreement, Minute 293 of the International Boundary
and Water Commission (IBWC), and identifies important unresolved issues
related to the bilateral management of drought situations. The third section
explores such institutional options as may exist within and outside the
present treaty framework, with emphasis on the role and work of the IBWC
and more recently formed international environmental institutions
associated with the establishment of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFrA).
THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR BINATIONAL
DROUGHT MANAGEMENT
The international institutional framework for managing droughts
affecting the U.S.-Mexico border region is found in two treaties that
respectively apportion the shared waters of the Rio Grande and Colorado
Rivers and their tributaries. The first of these documents, the Convention
between the United States and Mexico on the Equitable Distribution of the
Waters of the Rio Grande, signed in 1906," applies to the upper reach of the
Rio Grande River from its headwaters to the point where the river passes
by Fort Quitman, Texas. Mexico takes all its allotted water through the
Acequia Madre (otherwise known as the Old Mexican Canal) at Cd. JuArez,
Chihuahua. Article II of this treaty states, "In case, however, of extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in the United
States, the amount [of water] delivered to the Mexican Canal shall be
diminished in the same proportion as the water delivered to lands under
said irrigation system in the United States."'
The second document, the Treaty Between the United States and
Mexico Regarding the Utilization of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and

4. Convention between the United States and Mexico: Equitable Distribution of the

Waters of the Rio Grande, May 21, 1906, US.-Mex., 34 Stat. 2953 [hereinafter 1906 Water

Treaty).
5. Id. art. I.
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of the Waters of the Rio Grande, signed in 1944,6 applies to the lower reach
of the Rio Grande River below E Paso-Cd. Jutrez and to the distribution
of the waters of the Colorado River. Provisions directly affecting drought
management are found in Articles 11 and III, Article IV, Article IX,Article
X, Article XXIV, and Article XXV. Article II provides for the establishment
of the IBWC and Articles XXIV and XXV entrust it with the settlement of
disputes arising from the Treaty.7 Article I specifies the priority of uses to
be followed by the Commission in providing for the joint use of international waters, according first priority to domestic and municipal use,
second priority to agriculture and stock raising, third priority to electric
power, fourth priority to "other industrial uses," fifth priority to navigation, sixth priority to fishing and hunting, and seventh priority [last
priority) to "any other beneficial uses which may be determined."8
Article IV of the Treaty, with reference to the lower Rio Grande,
stipulates the allocation of water below Ft. Quitman, Texas, such that, in
brief, the United States receives all of the water of its major tributary
streams (Pecos River, Devils River, Goodenough Springs, and Alamito,
Terlingua, San Felipe, and Pinto Creeks) and one-third of the water from
the major Mexican tributaries up to a maximum amount of 350,000 acrefeet (431, 721,000 cubic meters) annually, to include the Conchos, San
Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido and Saldo Rivers and the La Vacas Arroyo,
excepting the waters of the San Juan River and the Alamos River, which
belong entirely to Mexico. 9 The two countries share any remaining waters
equally. Article IV goes on to stipulate that:.
In the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident to
the hydraulic systems on the measured Mexican tributaries,
making it difficult for Mexico to make available the runoff of
350,000 acre-feet (431,721,000 cubic meters) annually, allotted
in subparagraph (c) of paragraph B of this Article to the
United States as the minimum contribution from the aforesaid Mexican tributaries, any deficiencies existing at the end
of the aforesaid five-year cycle shall be made up in the
following five-year cycle with water from the said measured
tributaries.
When the conservation capacities assigned to the United
States in at least two of the major international reservoirs,
including the highest major reservoir, are filled with waters

6. Treaty Regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Feb. 3,1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 thereinafter 1944 Water Treaty).
7. Id. arts. II, XXIV, XXV.
8. Id. art. MI.
9. Id. art. IV.
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belonging to the United States, a cycle of five years shall be
considered paid, whereupon a new five-year cycle shall
commence.

Article D(, with reference to the Rio Grande, further provides that,
The Commission shall have the power to authorize either

country to divert and use water not belonging entirely to
such country, when the water belonging to the other country
can be diverted and used without injury to the latter and can

be replaced at some other point on the river. [Section D] 11

The Commission shall have the power to authorize temporary diversion and use by one country of water belonging to
the other when the latter does not need it or is unable to use
it, provided that such authorization of the use of such water

shall not establish any right to continue to divert it. [Section
EJ12
In case of the occurrence of an extraordinary drought in one
country with an abundant supply of water in the other
country, water stored in the international storage reservoirs
and belonging to the country enjoying such abundant water
supply may be withdrawn, with the consent of the Commission, for the use of the country undergoing the drought
[Section F] 3
Article X, with reference to the Colorado River, guarantees Mexico
1,500,000 acre-feet of water (1,850,234,000 cubic meters) annually, reserving
the rest for the United States. It further provides that,
In the event of extraordinary drought or serious accident to
the irrigation system in the United States, thereby making it
difficult for the United States to deliver the guaranteed
quantity of 1,500,00 acre-feet (1,850,234,000 cubic meters) a
year, the water allotted to Mexico under subparagraph (a) of
this Article will be reduced in the same proportions as

consumptive uses in the United States are reduced."
The general provisions of the1944 Water Treaty contained in Articles II,
XXIV and XXV, and Article I may also be said to apply to any efforts on

Id.
11. Id. art. IX.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. art. X.
10.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 39

the part of the IBWC to deal with drought problems arising on the Tijuana
River. Article XVI with reference to the Tijuana stipulates,
In order to improve existing uses and to assure any feasible
further development, the Commission shall study and
investigate, and shall submit to the two Governments for
their approval: 1) Recommendations for the equitable
distribution between the two countries of the waters of the
Tijuana River system; 2) Plans for storage and flood control
to promote and develop domestic, irrigation and other
feasible uses of the waters of this system...s
These formal provisions for drought management, as so many observers
have noted, contain critical ambiguities and lacunae considered in light of
the many drought contingencies the two countries might have to address
along their common boundary as well as contemporary needs. Various
analysts have noted the ambiguities contained in the 1906 and 1944 treaty
language in the phrase "extraordinary drought or serious accident" to
mentioned irrigation or delivery systems in either country.16 Determination
of extraordinarydrought is nowhere specified in the treaties-it is essentially
a political question, left in the hands of IBWC and other diplomatic
negotiators to be determined on a case by case basis. While this solution
maximizes flexibility, it fails to provide minimal assurances of the
adequacy of supply to downstream parties suffering from prolonged
severe reductions in water supply. In this same vein, analysts have
correctly noted that the Treaty fails to anticipate long term changes in
climatic conditions that could seriously exacerbate problems arising from
overallocation of water (a particular problem on the Colorado River),
reduction in water storage, rapidly rising water demand, and periodic
temporary drought.17 Where long-term, incremental climatic changes occur,
significant difficulties could arise over the interpretation of the extraordinary
drought provisions, both with respect to how the provision would be
triggered as well as how it should be terminated. s In this respect, analyst

15. Id. art. XVI.
16. See Cesar Sepulveda, Los Recursos Hidraulicosen [a Zona FronterizaMexico-Estados
Unidos. Perspectiva de la Problematica Hacia at Ano 2000-A/gunas Recomendacnes, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 1081 (1982); Albert E Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U.S.-Mexican
Water Resources: Anticipating the Year 2000,22 NAT. RESotcES J. 1097 (1982); Peter H. Glieck,
Te Effects of Future Climatic Changes on InternationalWater Resources: the Colorado River, the
United States and Mexico, 21 POL'Y Sd. 23 (1988).
17. See GLICIK, supra note 16, at 27-29. The current U.S. policy debate over
decommissioning Glen Canyon dam is worth noting as it would significantly diminish
available water storage on the Colorado River. See Mark Eddy, Grand Canyon the Issue with
Dam, DENVE POST, Oct. 9,1997, at 1.
18. See GLEKCK, supra note 16, at 33.
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Peter Gleick, director of the Pacific Institute, has argued that a precise
definition of the term climate change should be agreed upon by the two
countries as a means of addressing potential long-term problems that could
arise with potentially severe impacts on allocations and uses throughout
the region.'
Other criticisms of the current institutional framework point to the
allocative inequity of the 1906 and 1944 water treaties." In the case of the
former, the United States has a highly disproportionate share of the water
and controls both the source and the flow of the resource, suggesting that
any negotiated reductions might also be expected to favor the United States
in the allocation of costs and benefits of any drought management solution
on the upper Rio Grande. In the case of the latter, both the Rio Grande
allocation and the Colorado allocation favor the United States, suggesting
similar upstream-downstream problems, particularly on the Colorado
River where the United States also has a virtual monopoly on source, flow,
and storage.
Also apparent from the treaty language is the inadequate reach of
the current drought management regime. Under current arrangements,
there are various lacunae in drought management coverage along the
border. Apart from its general provisions, the treaty provides no particular
obligation to either country to respond to or accommodate the concerns of
the other country on the Tijuana River. It makes no reference at all to
streams and arroyos in the coastal range on the Pacific, nor to various
isolated streams and rivers on the Arizona-Sonora border. It is questionable
whether distant tributaries to the Colorado River-the San Pedro River or
the Santa Cruz River--are covered under the terms of Article 10 or should
be considered separately. And, it makes no reference to non-artesian
groundwater acquifers recharged from surface precipitation.
Additionally, analysts have increasingly questioned some of the
general provisions of the 1944 Treaty, ranging from criticism of the
structure of water use priorities assigned in Article III to criticism of the
IBWC.21 These criticisms are well known and are only briefly recapitulated
here. With respect to use priorities, some argue the structure of uses is
anachronistic, reflecting historic rather than contemporary practices.
Protecting instream flows and preserving biodiversity (wetlands, habitat,
et cetera) by strict construction, among the least valued uses of water under
the treaty as written may (by contemporary standards) outrank the value

19. See id.
20. See Lopez, supra note 3.
21. See, e.g., JASON L MORRISONr AU PACIFIC INS. FOR SIUDIES N DEVELOPMENT, ENV'T,
AND SECURrY AND THE GLOBAL WATER Poucy PROJECT, THE SUSTAINABLE USE OF WATER IN
Th LOWER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 63-64 (1996).
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of navigation or fishing and hunting (functions accorded higher priority by
the 1944 Water Treaty).
The IBWC's jurisdiction and mandate as well as its structures and
procedures have also been called into question. Perhaps most relevant for
purposes of drought management, the IBWC's jurisdiction is quite narrow
in geographic terms, limited to the boundary itself and boundary waters
as they constitute the boundary, and may thus be seen as technically
inadequate for dealing with water supply problems of regional scope.
Analysts drawn to administrative concepts like "ecosystem management"
or "drainage basin management" have long chaffed at the more limited
jurisdiction of the Commission, viewing it as a political creation, mired in
sovereignty, and mismatched to modem management challenges raised by
ecological zones and hydrological cycles.' The Commission's mandate, to
build and operate joint works and resolve such disputes as may arise
related to the treaties under its jurisdiction, is seen as essentially reactive
and ad hoc rather than proactive and capable of addressing problems in a
systematic, comprehensive, and future-oriented fashion. Finally, the
Commission's diplomatic structure is criticized as insular, secretive, and
unresponsive to public concerns, factors conceived for the purpose of
defending sovereign entitlements rather than forging consensual grassroots
solutions to transboundary problems. 3
These various criticisms of the present institutional framework
certainly have merit, at least by degrees, and deserve to be taken seriously.
They suggest some of the more important issues that ought to be addressed
in any effort to improve on current practices and institutional arrangements
for managing drought. Treaties, however, are political documents that
reflect the diplomatic possibilities of the past as reinforced by the cumulative record of institutional practices in their service, and, as such, are often
difficult to change. This is certainly the case where allocations of critical
natural resources are involved, as is the situation here. Because it is highly
unlikely that the present binding treaties allocating water resources
between the United States and Mexico will be reopened for revision given
the enormity of the political stakes involved, it is important to look for
institutional reforms that may be had by reinterpreting treaty provisions,
readjusting current institutional practices in ways that are consistent with
the basic institutional framework or affirm it, or by other international

22. See Helen Ingrai et al., InternationalBoundaryand Water Commission:An Institutional
Misiatchfor Resolving TransboudaryWater Problens,33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 153 (1993); Roberto

Sanchez, Public Participationand the IBWC: Challengesand Options, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.283
(1993); MARY KELLY, TEXAS CT. FO POUCY STUDMS, FACN REALrrY: THE NEED FOR
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES INPRoECnNG THE ENVIRONMENT ALONG THE US./MExaco BORDER

(1991).
23. See id.
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mechanisms operating outside the treaty framework that may improve
current practices without impairing treaty based commitments. Before
examining a range of reform possibilities within these parameters,
however, it is wise to draw a few lessons from recent application of the
binational institutional framework in the case of the current drought.
THE 1990'S DROUGHT AND MINUTE 293:
LINGERING INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The 1990's drought by most accounts began in 1992, as measurable
seasonal precipitation declined across a broad swath of North America
(ranging from the southwestern United States to the Yucatan). The most
severe impacts were felt in northern Mexico, across five largely arid states,
Sonora, Chihuahua, Durango, Coahuila, Nuevo Le6n, and Tamaulipas. In
these states, protracted drought conditions over several years led to
dramatic reductions in water reserves for irrigated agriculture and had
devastating effects on the cattle industry, commercial and subsistence
agriculture, and many isolated communities in rural areas.24 Nationwide,
Mexican ranching and agricultural drought-based losses are estimated
upwards of 1.1 billion U.S. dollars.'
In Mexico, by 1995 reservoirs in Chihuahua and Nuevo Le6n were
reported at less than five percent of normal storage' and a national water
emergency had been declared. Available Rio Grande water was placed off
limits to irrigators, officially reserved only for urban and domestic
consumption.' Under the Drought Emergency Program, 108.2 million U.S.
dollars were dedicated to augment irrigation and water conveyance
systems and improve the supply of potable water for needy communities.
Despite such stopgap measures, the drought accentuated interstate rivalries
for stored water,' disrupted migration and labor patterns, and contributed
to a significant rise in health problems, particularly outbreaks of cholera.29
In Texas, where drought effects were also severe with over 5 billion U.S.
24. See BoB SmvANsIj, DOuGi
NO
N MEXCO, WEEKLY WEATHER & CROP BULL.
23 (June 27,1995); James E. Garcia, Droughton the Border, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, May 7,
1995, at C12; Nancy Cleeland, DevastatingDrought,SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 26,1995.
25. See Wsther Shrader, Mexiazns Starve Amid SearingDrought,SAN JoSE MERCURY NEWS,
July 21,1996.
26. See Cleeland, supra note 19.
27. See Marcelo Morichi & Jan Gilbreath, DroughtBrings Severe CropReductions and Cattle
Losses
to
Mexico
(July
21,
1995)
<http://www.utexas.edu/depts/lbjsdoo/usmex/usmex.htm>.
28. See Mexican State is Told to Share Water or Pay NeighborMillions, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan.
9,1996; Schrader, supra note 25; IDB-funded Dam Sparks Water-Rights Dispute,4 BORDERINBS,
Mar.1996, at 9.

29. See id.
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dollars in estimated economic losses,3 state water authorities intensified
their conservation programs, conducting water conservation workshops for
over 100 public water districts,31 urging irrigation districts to ration water
supplies as feasible, and alerting water users to the need to plan for
possible reductions in supply.32
At the international level, facing intense pressure from the
agricultural sector, Mexican President Emesto Zedillo approached the U.S.
State Department and Texas authorities in May 1995 with a formal request
to divert up to 81,000 acre-feet of water for irrigation and other purposes
from U.S. (Texas) allocated storage water in the international Rio Grande
dams.3' Zedillo was initially rebuffed by the State Department and Texas
Governor George W. Bush.:%Governor Bush took the position that the state
of Texas could not legally preempt private water rights and that until it was
certain that Texas water rights holders drawing water from the Rio Grande
had an assured supply for the summer and fall it would be unwise to make
a commitment to Mexico.,3 In a subsequent meeting with Mexico's border
governors, Bush relented and agreed to allow Mexico to withdraw a
smaller amount for human consumption only. '
Based on Texas' initiative, as well as evidence of serious Mexican
conservation and mitigation efforts in the face of persistent drought, the
United States (and Texas) consented to allow a water loan up to the amount
of 81,000 acre-feet over a period of 18 months beginning in November 1995.
IBWC Minute 293 expresses this arrangement.37
Minute 293, in its introductory part, recognizes the existence of an
"urgent need" for water in Mexico.30Referring to the "spirit of Article 9 of
the 1944 Water Treaty," it allows that "a framework of cooperation between
the two countries could be considered to allow Mexico to alleviate the
extreme drought that affects Mexico, giving preference to domestic and

30.
31.

See Haurwitz, supranote 1.
See S. Parks, Draught to Force Tough Decisions on Water, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May

9,1996.
32. See id.
33. See Laurence lliff,
U.S. Rejects Mexiao's Requestfor Water, ELFINANCIEROW'LEDmON,

May 22-28,1995, at 1 (Mexico City, Mex.); Tod Robberson, Turning off the Water Tap Along a
Dusty Border, WASH. POST NATL WKLY. EDIION, June 5-11, 1995, at 16.
34. See 11iff, supra note 33; Robberson, supranote 33.
35. See Iiff, supra note 33; Robberson, supra note 33.
36. See L liff, Drought Worsens; U.S. to Offer Water, EL FINANCIERO INT'L EDmON, May
29-June 4,1995, at 3; Morici &Glbreath, supranote 27.
37. See INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, MINUTE 293, EMERGENCY
COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO SUPPLY MUNICIPAL NEEDS OF MEXICAN COMMUNITIES LOCATED
ALONG THE Rio GRANDE DOWNSTEAM OF AMMrAD DAM (OcL 4,1995) (visited Apr. 4,1999)
<http://www.ibwc.state.gov/min293.htm.>.

38. Seeid.
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municipal uses of the international waters in accordance with Article IMof
the 1944 Water Treaty." Noting that a reduction of Mexico's allotted
reservoir water below the level of 121,606 acre-feet would impair Mexico's
ability to satisfy needed municipal water supplies along the river,
Resolution 1 of the Minute allows Mexico to borrow up to 81,071 acre-feet
from the United States. The water is to be drawn from the United States'
entitlement on the Conchos River for this purpose and may be borrowed
so long as the combined storage of United States' waters in the international dams (Amistad and Falc6n) remains in excess of 600,000 acre-feet.'
Under Resolution 2 of the agreement, after the loaned water is delivered,
all water borrowed from the United States' entitlement is to be repaid when
Mexico's storage in Amistad reservoir exceeds 162,142 acre-feet and its
storage at Falc6n reservoir exceeds 40,536 acre-feet.41 Finally, Minute 293
recognizes the importance of exchanging information on water management practices by the ':competent water agencies in the two countries" and
the importance of reinforcing IBWC practices in this regard "to cover
information sharing and conservation measures. " 4
Minute 293, despite its particularities, will doubtlessly serve to
some degree as a precedent setting agreement-an indicative framework
for dealing with future drought situations on the Rio Grande and, very
likely, elsewhere along the border. For this reason, it is useful to reflect on
the basic conditions associated with this solution to Mexico's drought
predicament.
On the positive side, the 1995 agreement may be lauded for
affecting a cooperative, if partial, solution to the Mexican drought crisis on
the Rio Grande. The agreement may be taken as defacto recognition by
both parties, but particularly the United States, of the need, indeed the
obligation, to assist its treaty partner in times of acute water scarcity. The
agreement formally recognizes and reaffirms the 1944 Treaty's prioritization of domestic and municipal water uses as the most vital uses of
allocated water on the border. It further reaffirms the constructive role of
the IBWC as a diplomatic mechanism for crafting solutions to controversial
and highly politicized binational problems.
On the negative side, the agreement is obviously restrictive and
does little to address the issues of longstanding concern in drought
management. Taken as a set of actions culminating in Minute 293, the
binational approach to managing the 1990's drought has the following
informal and formal features:

39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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1. Crisis (drought) management within the 1944 Treaty Framework (Minute 293)
2. Case by case negotiations directed by the IBWC (Minute 293)
3. Subnational veto over federal initiative (defacto political

reality)
4. Reliance on stored reservoir water (Minute 293)
5. Cooperation by water lending (consistent with the treaty)
rather than donation (Minute 293)
6. Relatively short credit timelines for borrowers (Minute 293)
7. Rapid recovery of owed water (Minute 293)
8. Concessions for the satisfaction of top priority (Article 111-1944
Water Treaty) uses only (Minute 293)
9. Heightened cooperation for data sharing on water availability
and management (Minute 293)
10. Technical assistance for improving water conservation
practices in Mexico (State of Texas offer).
These mechanisms neglect a number of outstanding issues. First,
though Minute 293 expressly invokes the 1944 Treaty, referring to Article
IX for authority,0 it fails to provide an adequate, even approximate
definition of the notion of extraordinarydrought.While Minute 293 clearly
recognizes the existence of a water emergency on the Mexican side of the
Rio Grande, it refers variously to a "critical situation," to "dramatically
reduced inflow," or to a "serious threat to meeting water.supply demands"
with reference to Mexico." The net effect is to leave the definition of what
constitutes an extraordinarydrought to situational determination-in effect,
if a nation believes it has an extraordinarydrought situation it may approach
the other country with its claim. Second, Minute 293 is highly specific;
while it is in a sense precedent setting, it offers no explicit guidance for the
handling of future droughts. While it reaffirms 1944 Treaty provisions for
handling drought situations on the Rio Grande, it does not attempt to
extend these principles, or extrapolate from the prescribed solution under
treaty, to apply to other situations along the border or existing lacunae in
the international drought management framework Third, there is no effort
to modify the 1944 Water Treaty's priority of uses, or to acknowledge the
importance of dealing with other water needs that might be affected by this
or future droughts. It would thus be difficult to use Minute 293 to advance
or improve the reach of the extant drought management regime at the
international level. Fourth, while strengthening binational commitment to
sharing technical information on water management for purposes of

43. See id.
44. See id.
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conservation and planning in the Rio Grande basin, s it appears to do little
by way of moving the two countries towards long-range planning for
drought mitigation-to include considerations of social, economic,
administrative, and climatic factors shaping water availability and
utilization in the border region, much less the adoption of ecosystemic or
drainage basin approaches to water management. Fifth, the 1995 drought
management solution does little to address the broader equity issues
implicit in the allocation of water along the border, or to better align the
two countries with today's customary legal norms pertaining to the
equitable utilization of waters. Finally, it is obvious but worth mentioning
that the IBWC's jurisdiction and mandate remain unaltered.
The 1995 solution thus leaves much to be done at the international
level in the line of managing protracted severe drought along the border.
While there is little chance the basic treaty framework will be formally
revised, there are nevertheless a number of concrete actions that could be
taken both within and outside the current treaty framework that would
strengthen binational capacity for drought management. The next section
of this paper identifies several of the more interesting options that might
be taken for strengthening drought management along the border.
STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR
DROUGHT MANAGEMENT ON THE BORDER
If Minute 293 and the measures taken to alleviate the drought
emergency in 1995 affirm but do not significantly add to the existing
framework for international cooperation in drought management, what
measures might be taken to strengthen this framework? To answer this
question it is necessary to look at potential improvements within the
present institutional framework as well as outside of it.
Drought Management Reform within the Treaty Framework
Strengthening drought management within the treaty framework
means taking advantage of existing treaty language to develop and extend
international obligations and practices. The principal barrier to achieving
such gains is political rather than statutory, and given the embeddedness
of political commitments and practices at the federal and state level on both
sides of the border, such reforms are difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, with
public support and diplomatic effort, changes of this sort are more
attainable than textual revisions to the basic treaties governing national
obligations in this area.

45. See id.
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Assuming the political will is present, a number of changes may be
had through deepening existing treaty-authorized practices or developing
new authority pursuant to treaty through executive agreement of the two
governments (in this case the Minute device of the IBWC). As to the former
method, Resolution 7 of the IBWC's Minute 293 suggests one avenue of
reform when it stipulates that,
The Commission will continue the practice of exchanging
information regarding water management practices by
competent agencies in the two countries in the best interest
of having basin-wide information that will enable the proper
authorities in the two countries to have the best information
possible in developing conservation and other planning
strategies in the part of the Rfo Grande basin in their respective territories.""
Inthis case, it would not require too much extrapolation of its
present powers to authorize the IBWC to incorporate additional socioeconomic and other relevant data affecting water availability and utilization
into its planning database, extending the practice to the whole border, and
to make these data available to other governmental and non-governmental
bodies for utilization in regional water management.47 It is worth noting
here that Texas' state environmental and water officials have long
complained about the "lack of communication and coordination" among
agencies and institutions and the failure "to develop data into usable form"
for substantive application. ' Despite centralized water administration in
Mexico, numerous data and communications problems limit national
capacity to anticipate and respond to critical water supply problems,
including drought."9 Building on Resolution 7 the IBWC could play an

46. Sec id.
47. For a discussion of this aspect of the IBWC's functions, see Eaton & Hurlburt, supra
note 1, at 90-93.
48. TVAs WATER RESOuRcES INST., TEXAS A&M UNIV., TR-166, ENVIRONMENTAL I
OF THE U.S.-MEXaCO BORDE REGioN, A WORKSHOP SUMMARY 9 (Howard L. Mastrom &
Wayne R. Jordan eds.,1994).
49. A recent World Bank study observes:
Although some drought contingency planning and management is done in
Mexico, it is mostly localized and directed towards dealing with
emergencies while they occur. What is needed is the definition of criteria
and procedures, the development of detailed drought contingency plans,
and the adoption of institutional and coordination mechanisms for
implementing the plans prior to, during and after droughts.
Adequate reservoir operation and emergency management in Mexico, either
in the case of floods or droughts, is hampered because of a dearth of
hydrometric, climatological, and meteorological datar, owing to the
insufficient density and quality level of networks and their degradation
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important role as a regional clearinghouse and analytical center for water
supply data with a bearing on drought management. In view of the IBWC's
specialized role in treaty implementation and transboundary water
management generally, the Commission might well be authorized to
spearhead a drought management task force, working with national and
international bodies as it presently does in the Border XXI interagency
water working group and extending participation in this case to state, local,
and non-governmental organizations. The goals here would be to
encourage the governments and localities to move more aggressively to
conserve water resources, assist the governments in this process, and
consider various contingency arrangements that could be recommended
to the governments to meet particular situations.' ° While domestic political
support is still very much a part of any such planning process, participating parties and water interests would be better informed and in some
instances, perhaps, better prepared to buy into binational drought
management schemes. 51
In addition to measures in this vein, and perhaps as an outgrowth
of this type of more intensive cooperation for drought management, the
governments might consider using the IBWC to achieve certain treaty
modifications. A short list of candidate reform that might be taken up in
this way includes seeking agreement on the operational definition of
extraordinarydrought;or seeking agreement that would authorize the IBWC
to issue a formal drought warning that could be used to trigger national
conservation measures; or seeking agreement on a defacto reordering of
water use priorities under Article II-hunting and fishing, for example,
might be construed as habitat preservation and a mandate to support
biodiversity objectives at a higher order or priority than is presently given.
More ambitious, but also feasible within the Treaty context, is the

since roughly 1985. During critical situations there are not enough rainfall
data available and there are extremely few rainfall intensity reports.
THE WORLD BANK REP.No. 15435-ME, STAFF APPRAISAL REPORT: MExico WATER RsouRcEs
MANAGEMENT PROJECY § 1.27, Table D.1 (May 31,1996).
50. It is perhaps worth noting that the Texas Water Development Board has
recommended that the Texas State Legislature authorize the Texas Water Commission (TWC)
to develop and implement a drought contingency plan as part of the water rights and
wastewater approval process. It also recommended that the TWC should "require existing
permit holders to implement water conservation programs and to prepare drought
contingency plans within a two year period." TExAs WATER Drv. BD., WATR FOR TExAs:
TODAY AND TOMORROW 4-4, (1990). The IBWC certainly has a mandate and the capacity to
coordinate with and assist state agencies like the TWC in estimating water availability and
developing basin wide rationing strategy.
51. For the record, Texas water interests used Mexico's lower level of conservation
preparedness as an excuse for resisting concessions in the 1995 drought assistance
negotiations. See Cleeland, supra note 24.
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development of agreements defining and addressing the problem of climate
change, allocating transboundary groundwater resources, allocating the
waters of other unallocated streams, and the development of joint
cooperative schemes for recharge and groundwater storage (water
banking) to better husband scarce water supplies.
Treaty Compatible Drought Management Reforms
It may well be the case that the more important initiatives
undertaken for advancing binational cooperation for managing periodic
protracted drought and long range climate change affecting the availability
of water resources in the region will be pursued outside the formal
framework for bilateral drought management, but in a manner largely
compatible with it. The evolution of institutions for binational cooperation
has been substantial since the 1944 Water Treaty was made over fifty years
ago and has accelerated in the past five years. A short list of recent
developments with implications for drought management along the border
includes the 1983 La Paz Framework Agreement on border environmental
cooperation,7' the Border XXI environmental cooperation process that has
grown out of the La Paz Agreement," the Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC) and its institutional sibling, the North American
Development Bank (NADBank),s and the transregional Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC).
These new institutions have already contributed to water management policy along the border and offer a range of opportunities for
approaching issues that might otherwise be difficult to address at the level
of the IBWC, singly, or within the formal and political limitations of the
1944 Water Treaty. For instance, the La Paz Agreement and, recently, the
Border XXI Framework, have generated a binational institutional process
for interagency consultation on substantive environmental issues at the
federal level with some subnational governmental participation in decision
making in each country. Border x's Water Working Group is composed

52. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment
in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10827 (hereinafter the La Paz
Agreement].
53. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NO. 160-R-96-003, U.S.-MExIco BORDER XXI
PROGRAM FRAMEWORK DOcumENT (Oct. 1996) [hereinafter Border XXI Program).
54. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation
Commission and a North American Development Bank, Nov. 16, 18, 1993, Mex.-U.S., 32
LL.M. 1545.
55. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Final Draft), in THE
ENVIRONMENT AND NAFrA, UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL
LAW (Pierre Marc Johnson & Andre Beaulieu eds., 1996).
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of the IBWC, the BECC, Mexico's National Water Commission (CNA), and
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), with the IBWC playing
a leading role in coordinating the Group's activities.'6 Much of the Group's
recent work has focused on the development of BECC certified projects
aimed at building and financing new, largely urban, border water
infrastructure. s' Such infrastructure development is often linked to
conservation and will have the long range effect of reducing water losses
by upgrading deteriorated urban water delivery systems, supporting waste
water reclamation, as well as helping to ensure that new water systems
conserve water more efficiently. The need for such infrastructure was
frequently mentioned in press accounts of the 1990's drought.' While the
Water Working Group has focused its activities on mostly short-term,
practical objectives to date, it could, as suggested above, serve as a nontreaty mechanism for coordinating regional discussions of conservation
ideas, planning concepts, and administrative and statutory reforms, both
domestic and binational, aimed at advancing more efficient water use,
conservation, and regional responses to protracted drought. The promotion
of a region wide, comprehensive geographic information system (GIS)
planning mechanism, as already envisioned," will prove a considerable
asset in binational drought management planning. Border XXI's strategic
planning process, moreover, provides a mechanism for involving public
participation in the crafting of binational responses to water scarcity.'
The CEC, for its part, provides a useful forum for developing ideas
and strategies for dealing with problems of continental scope-global
climate change, for example-and those with implications for regional
water management along the border. As a trinational institution with a
mandate for addressing transboufndary issues throughout the North
American context, the CEC can take up issues that might otherwise
languish on the binational agenda, providing a forum for discussion and
debate of problems and policy alternatives, dealing at least hypothetically
with questions that link water to trade through the environment, examining water markets and water transfer schemes (though it is important to
note that natural resources management, as such, was formally and
deliberately excluded from CEC's mandate6 1), and prodding the govern-

56. See Border xxi Program, supra note 53, at .9.
57. See id. at 1. 17.
58. Martin Espinoza, Keeping the Water Flowing, EL FINANCIERO INT'LEDmON, Jan. 22-28,
1996, at 8.
59. See Border XXI Program, supranote 53, at 1. 39.
60. See id. at H. 1.
61. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 55, at art.

45, § 2(b).
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ments to proceed with various transboundary agendas in the border area
in the interest of meeting and deepening region-wide commitments.
CONCLUSION
The impact of the 1990's drought (dare we say extraordinary
impact?) certainly draws attention to the limitations of the current
international drought management system along the U.S.-Mexico border.
While it is commendable that the IBWC, with the cooperation of Texas state
officials, struck a temporary agreement (Minute 293) to provide water relief
to Mexico, this review shows that the Minute 293 solution falls well short
of addressing a range of important drought management questions
affecting U.S.-Mexican relations. Few of these problems are new, most
have been well recognized for years. To date, however, the governments
have lacked the vision and the will to seriously grapple with these
questions.
As seen above, there is, in fact, a good deal that can be done to
better manage protracted droughts along the border short of attempting to
renegotiate the water treaties allocating water along the major international
rivers. At the institutional level, we now have a set of new international
institutions and practices affecting transboundary water management
along the border that enhance binational capacity to find new solutions to
the enduring problems of allocating and conserving water resources. It is
to be hoped that the two governments, with the IBWC playing a constructive role in the process, may be persuaded to take advantage of the graphic
lessons delivered by the 1990's drought to better prepare for cooperative
solutions to future droughts as these may and will occur along their
common border.

